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Abstract  
There are numerous weaknesses associated with industrial buyers’ collection and use of 
supplier performance evaluation (SPE) information (a.k.a., past performance information). 
These weaknesses call into question the efficacy of SPEs. Neither the factors affecting SPE 
efficacy (i.e., its antecedents) nor the effects of SPE efficacy (i.e., consequences) on 
suppliers have been empirically explored. Despite the fallibility of SPE schemes, there are no 
known studies that explore the accuracy of SPEs, nor are there studies examining whether 
and how inaccurate SPEs affect suppliers—specifically, their performance. The purpose of 
this research, therefore, is to identify the factors affecting SPE efficacy, then to examine how 
SPE efficacy, in turn, affects supplier outcomes. This research will employ a mixed method of 
qualitative interviews and quantitative analysis of survey data collected from suppliers and 
from assessors of supplier performance.  
Introduction 
Industrial buyers labor to avoid the deleterious effects of the laws of agency. In 
industrial buying, the supplier serves as an agent to the principal (i.e., the buying 
organization). Substantial transaction costs are dedicated to avoid adverse selection—the 
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risk of selecting an incapable supplier that otherwise misrepresents itself as capable. 
Following contract formation, more transaction costs are incurred to monitor supplier 
performance to thwart supplier opportunism ex post. 
Supplier performance evaluation (SPE) became popular in the 1950s (Wieters & 
Ostrom, 1979), and now SPE is an essential best practice in business-to-business sourcing 
(Gordon, 2008; Talluri & Sarkis, 2002). SPE is “the process of evaluating, measuring, and 
monitoring supplier performance and suppliers’ business processes and practices for the 
purposes of reducing costs, mitigating risk, and driving continuous improvement” (Gordon, 
2008, p. 4). SPEs are used to (1) prioritize supplier improvement activities, (2) focus 
management attention on critical suppliers, (3) support supplier selection decisions, (4) 
communicate dissatisfaction with supplier performance, (5) communicate performance 
expectations to suppliers, (6) document historical performance, (7) inform the purchasing 
department of supply base performance, (8) influence suppliers, and (9) continuously 
improve (Schmitz & Platt, 2003). Specifically, SPEs inform source selection decisions of the 
likelihood that a prospective supplier will successfully perform the contract (FASA, 1994).  
Similarly, the primary purpose of the U.S. federal government’s Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) “is to ensure that current, complete 
and accurate information on contractor performance is available for use in procurement 
source selections” (Naval Sea Logistics Center Portsmouth, 2014, p.1). The idea is that by 
better informing source selection decisions, better best value selections will occur. Integrally 
related is the supplier’s level of performance. If performance levels are assessed and 
recorded, and if this information is available to buyers during a future source selection, it is 
believed that suppliers will work harder to ensure satisfactory (or better) performance 
(OFPP, 2000).  
Despite long-term awareness of weaknesses and despite recent, concerted, high-
level efforts to improve past performance reporting, the government’s past performance 
evaluations of its suppliers continue to be deficient (GAO, 2014). Too often, they are not 
properly, timely, or accurately completed. Reports often lack sufficient information to support 
ratings (e.g., how the contractor exceeded or failed to meet requirements) necessary to 
withstand a legal challenge, or do not include a rating for all performance areas (OFPP, 
2011). Additionally, throughout the rating process, raters are often inclined to inflate ratings 
in order to avoid conflict with the contractor (GAO, 2009).  
Unreliable or inaccurate past performance assessments can harm contractors’ 
reputations and can bias source selections resulting in adverse selection. If past 
performance information is not reliable, and if buyers and evaluators do not (or cannot) use 
the information to discriminate between competitive proposals (Kelman, 2010), the effort of 
collecting and reporting the past performance information is squandered. Likewise, the 
efforts of prospective suppliers in documenting and of buyer-side evaluators in evaluating 
inaccurate past performance information during source selections is wasted. Notably, we 
don’t know how much transaction costs by all parties involved are consumed in completing a 
past performance evaluation. If the effort is significant, and the resultant information is of 
little value, policy-makers should revisit the policy and its implementing systems. 
Notwithstanding, buying organizations often use SPE information to identify and rank 
superior performing suppliers. Of course, the rankings and status are suspect if the 
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Problems are not unique to the not-for-profit sector. Hald and Ellegaard (2011) found 
that supplier evaluations change throughout the evaluation process. Underlying data 
captured in enterprise resource planning (ERP) databases is often flawed. Masses of 
performance data are condensed into more general ratings sacrificing fidelity. Buyers also 
commonly use multiple evaluators to rate supplier performance (Hald & Ellegaard, 2011; 
Buffa & Ross, 2011), which invites different perspectives of supplier performance. To what 
extent does evaluators’ dissonance affect perceived accuracy of SPEs? Additionally, the 
degree of internal dissonance of supplier evaluations has not yet been examined. Hald and 
Ellegaard (2011) also reported that performance ratings are sometimes negotiated with 
suppliers when the accuracy is challenged. However, no one has explored why buyers 
decide to change their evaluations.  
Despite the fallibility of SPE schemes, there are no known studies that explore the 
accuracy of SPEs. Therefore, further investigation is needed in order to explore the validity 
of SPE processes. After all, SPE assessments can affect key outcomes such as contract 
compliance, supplier performance-based payments, supplier reputation, future business 
awards, incentive awards, and status achievement (e.g., a “preferred” supplier). As such, the 
effectiveness of SPEs in assisting source selection decisions is questionable (Berrios, 
2006). In other words, we do not know the extent to which SPEs validly build the buyer’s 
confidence in its assessment of the risk of doing business with a particular supplier prior to 
contract award. Furthermore, the impact of deficient SPEs on the industrial supply base is 
unknown.  
Scope and Objectives 
The purpose of this research, therefore, is to explain the efficacy of SPE and to 
explore the effects of SPE efficacy on suppliers. This research will explore the extent to 
which the supplier performance information collection and usage processes achieve the 
intended goals of (1) mitigating the risk of adverse selection, and (2) motivating supplier 
performance. The following research questions will be explored:  
1. What factors decrease the efficacy of SPEs? 
2. How do suppliers react to inaccurate SPEs?  
3. Do SPEs, in general, motivate suppliers to increase performance? 
4. How does the accuracy of SPEs affect relationship quality?  
5. Why are SPEs often inaccurate?  
6. How many man-hours do suppliers invest in responding to SPEs? 
7. What communication tactics do suppliers use to manage the SPE process?  
8. To what extent does inter-rater disagreement (i.e., dissonance) affect SPE 
efficacy?  
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. The research 
explores antecedents and consequences to SPE efficacy, and uses two separate 
approaches to do so. To explore the antecedents, this research builds off of prior research 
(Hawkins, 2013) to test previously-suggested propositions of buyer-side factors that affect 
SPE efficacy. To identify the consequences of SPE efficacy on suppliers, an exploratory, 
qualitative approach is employed. First, a literature review is presented describing the 
conceptual framework and hypotheses. Next, the study presents the research designs and 
methodologies.  
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Literature Review 
Past Performance 
U.S. federal government contracting serves as the context for this study due to its 
expansive scope (dollars, industries, and geographies), rigor, established fairness, and 
standardized procedures. In U.S. federal government contracting, agencies are required to 
consider past performance information as an evaluation factor in source selections 
exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold, $150,000 (FAR Part 15)—unless the 
contracting officer documents a reason not to do so. Necessarily, then, agencies must 
collect and report contractor past performance information from government contracts (FAR 
Part 42) surpassing certain dollar values.  
It is important to note that in keeping with the government’s core goal of 
transparency and fairness (FAR 1.102), contractors must be afforded the opportunity to 
comment on the government’s assessment of past performance, and any disagreements 
must be resolved by a reviewing official one level above the contracting officer. Additionally, 
contractor past performance assessments are increasingly subject to the Contract Disputes 
Act of 1978 (Lord, 2005). While the courts will not yet direct a particular rating, they will 
require agencies to adequately support assessments/ratings with sufficient facts. This 
written justification consumes significant time from the raters, contractors (i.e., rebuttals), 
and approving officials. As further incentive to conceal true performance, program officials 
will go to extraordinary lengths to protect their programs. A poorly performing contractor can 
signal a troubled program, increasing the threat of cancelation (GAO, 2009). Other reasons 
that truthful performance is not reported include a desire to maintain relations with the 
contractor, difficulty attributing performance problems to the contractor or to the government, 
deficient oversight of contractors, deficient contract administration, and the government’s 
lack of contractor performance management (GAO, 2009). 
It is also important to note the U.S. Military Departments’ recently-emerged practice 
of ranking government contractors based on performance across multiple contracts. This 
annual ranking, deemed the superior supplier incentive program (SSIP), relies on 
performance data from CPARs (USD[AT&L], 2015). The purpose is to incentivize contractor 
performance, and to recognize those top achievers. Suppliers deemed a superior supplier 
are eligible for relaxed or more favorable contract terms and conditions. Hence, the efficacy 
of the SPE process takes on additional meaning by providing firms bragging rights (i.e., 
marketing material and enhanced reputation) and eased admininstrative burdens.  
Supplier Performance Evaluation 
It is not surprising that buying firms closely measure their suppliers’ performance 
when 50%–70% of their revenue is spent on goods and services to support the sales 
(Monczka et al., 2011b). Measuring supplier quality is critical since the cost of poor quality 
ranges from 10% to 25% of sales, and the cost of poor supplier quality ranges from 25% to 
70% of the cost of poor quality (Gordon, 2008). Commercial SPM systems—often web-
based and at least partially automated—encompass means to measure, rate, and rank 
suppliers. One study reported that 97% of firms use a periodic supplier scorecard or 
assessment for direct materials (CAPS Research, 2011).  
SPM pays off; a study by the Aberdeen Group (2005) found that supplier 
performance of companies with an SPM system improved significantly more than did the 
supplier performance of firms with no SPM system. Specifically, firms using an SPM system 
realized 10% greater price savings, 12% better on-time delivery improvement, four times 
greater quality improvement, and a 4% greater improvement in service. One large 
telecommunications firm realized a 290% reduction in the number of suppliers and a 260% 
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reduction in the value of inventory held due to an SPM system (Cormican & Cunningham, 
2007). Another study (Limberakis, 2011) found that “best-in-class” buyers (1) are much more 
likely to benchmark supplier performance against others in the same industry, (2) achieved 
substantially higher percent on-time delivery (88% versus 48% for “laggards”), and (3) 
transacted with suppliers that experienced fewer catastrophic failure (2% versus 5% for 
other buyers). Of the best-in-class buyers, 63% had a supplier benchmarking and 
performance monitoring information technology system in place. The use of an SPM system 
was also found to improve buyer–supplier relationships (Prahinski & Benton, 2004). 
Prahinski and Fan (2007) found that the frequency and content of feedback increase the 
suppliers’ commitment to the buyer, which, in turn, increases supplier performance. Denali 
Consulting group found that SPM can yield a 3% to 6% cost reduction in total supply chain 
costs via continuous improvements (Minahan, 2007). A study by CAPS Research (Monczka 
et al., 2011a) of eight firms found that supplier performance measurement is one of five 
critical components of effective supplier relationship management (SRM), and that SRM 
enables vast positive results such as the following: overhead cost reductions, process 
improvements, increased visibility into actual costs (versus price), year-over-year cost 
reductions, millions of dollars in savings, product launches on time and on cost, shorter new 
product development times, total cost reductions of 12%, and quality improvements. Not 
surprisingly, SPM is a core competence of chief procurement officers (Kern et al., 2011). 
Most SPM processes used by buyers integrate subjective and objective evaluations 
(Simpson et al., 2002; Hald & Ellegaard, 2011). It is assumed that these assessments are 
accurate; however, as Gordon (2008) pointed out, even the seemingly most-objective 
performance parameters, such as percent on-time delivery, can be subjective. The supplier 
evaluation process has rarely been examined, and social and organizational biases have 
been ignored (Purdy & Safayeni, 2000). Hald and Ellegaard (2011) found that supplier 
evaluations are shaped and reshaped throughout the evaluation process. They discovered 
performance data instability as captured in ERP databases. They also found that 
evaluations were derived by condensing a larger set of performance information to a 
smaller, more manageable set of numbers. Buyers also commonly use multiple evaluators 
to rate supplier performance (Buffa & Ross, 2011; Hald & Ellegaard, 2011). Buffa and Ross 
(2011) noted the importance of supplier evaluation by functionally heterogeneous evaluation 
teams. Subjective measures among multiple raters invite dissonance in ratings and 
opinions—either on the same performance observations or across different instances of 
performance (Buffa & Ross, 2011). Similarly, Perkins (1993) noted that the different 
members of the buying organization’s procurement team perceive the supplier’s value 
delivery differently. While Buffa and Ross (2011) offered an ex post means to accommodate 
variance among multiple evaluators, there remains little explanation as to systemic sources 
of the variance. Hence, are there factors that can be managed to mitigate performance 
evaluators’ dissonance? Additionally, the degree of internal dissonance of supplier 
evaluations has not yet been examined. Hald and Ellegaard (2011) also reported that 
performance ratings are sometimes negotiated with suppliers when the accuracy is 
challenged. However, no research has explored why buyers decide to change their 
evaluations.  
Given the above findings, the focal outcome of interest of this study is SPE 
Efficacy—defined herein as the extent to which SPEs achieve the two stated goals of 
motivating supplier performance and, during source selection, mitigating the risk of 
unsuccessful performance (i.e., avoid adverse selection). The ensuing review of the relevant 
literature identifies the central factors affecting SPE efficacy, then peels the onion back 
further to unveil their antecedents. 
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Agency Theory 
This research acknowledges multiple perspectives of agency theory as it applies to 
industrial exchange. The first perspective views the hired supplier as an agent to the buyer 
to achieve the buyer’s objectives. The second perspective examines the buyer internally 
acknowledging that the buyer is comprised of multiple agents to itself. For instance, 
employees working in procurement, logistics, financial management, engineering, end users 
of suppliers’ goods and services, and program management represent distinct interests 
within the firm. Agency theory wrestles with two problems: (1) conflicting interests between 
principal and agent and (2) difficulty and cost associated with monitoring agents, and the 
associated uncertainty for not having perfect information (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Beginning with the second perspective, using multiple raters within an organization to 
evaluate supplier performance can create conflicts of agency. In the case of past 
performance evaluations, evaluators of performance serve as agents to multiple principals—
their employing organization, their local organization or unit, and external stakeholders (e.g., 
shareholders or taxpayers in the public sector). Problems of agency arise when agents’ self-
interests differ from his or her employer’s goals (Bergen et al., 1992). Agency theory holds 
that once the principal delegates tasks to agents, there is an asymmetry in information and 
knowledge such that agents can shirk duties, distort information, and behave 
opportunistically. To combat these moral hazards, principals can increase monitoring of 
agents. A less costly approach to control agent opportunism is to align the goals of the 
agent to that of the principal, particularly using outcome-based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Ex ante, principals can screen potential agents to mitigate adverse selection.  
Problems may also emerge when agents must serve conflicting goals of multiple 
principals—also known as the “hydra factor” (Shapiro, 2005). In this case, the strategy of 
aligning agents’ interests with organizational goals is confounded by conflicting goals. This 
agency problem might manifest itself in weapon system acquisition when, for instance, a 
program plagued by technical difficulty is jeopardized if behind schedule or over budget 
(threat to taxpayers’ interest). Such a program could compromise the ability to deliver a 
system that meets end user needs (threat to end user). Additionally, jobs that are dependent 
on this program could be jeopardized (threat to program executive officer’s and Congress’ 
interest). In this case, an evaluator could be biased toward a favorable SPE in order to 
protect the supplier and the program from scrutiny. This is an area ripe for further research 
(Shapiro, 2005). 
In agency theory, large organizations of many people and sub-organizations are 
assumed to act as one homogeneous entity. This is criticized as “misplaced methodological 
individualism” (Worsham et al., 1997, p. 423). In addition to multiple principals to serve, 
there may be multiple evaluators (Shapiro, 2005)—particularly on large, complex contracts 
and where performance occurs in more than one location. In cases of inter-rater 
disagreement, how is the principle’s rating of a supplier (agent) derived? Given these 
problems of agency, rating dissonance is among the central constructs of this study. The 
variance in ratings due to multiple evaluators of supplier performance is referred to herein as 
rating dissonance. 
Organizational Behavior 
Contract performance often is a complex phenomenon to assess. It can involve 
many supplier personnel, many buyer evaluators (Wieters & Ostrom, 1979; Palmatier, 
2008), multiple internal stakeholders and organizations, and multiple performance criteria at 
many physical locations. Often, the stakes are high such as implications to profit and future 
business.  
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Findings from organizational behavior literature are germane. Academic literature on 
multiple-rater performance appraisal systems (e.g., 360-degree evaluations in which 
superiors, subordinates, and peers evaluate the ratee) has examined the underlying 
premise that more raters offer more unique, valuable information about the employee’s 
performance that would otherwise be lost if relying upon a single rater (van der Heijden & 
Nijhof, 2004). Additionally, more raters mitigate evaluation bias (Levy et al., 1998). While 
relying upon multiple ratings is thought to offer more fairness to ratees, variance in ratings is 
introduced attributable to individual differences in raters (Mount et al., 1998). Thus, different 
raters often conclude different ratings (Dowst, 1972; Levy et al., 1998), which may be 
attributed to different backgrounds, observing different instances of supplier performance, 
and different interpretations of the meaning of performance critieria and rating definitions. 
These differences take time and effort to resolve and internally agree upon a single rating or 
narrative. 
Multiple raters may be indicators of complexity (e.g., multiple points of failure and 
multiple locations). Suppliers may be able to more successfully rebut ratings under high 
complexity. Suppliers may also be more able to offset relatively minor failures with their 
successes, garnering an overall rating that is acceptable to the supplier. If a supplier can 
“escape” unscathed in the rating (i.e., no threat), there is little need to increase performance, 
and little threat of negative performance information being discovered during a future source 
selection. Given the potential for unreconciled dissonance, it is posited that 
H1: There will be a negative relationship between rating dissonance and SPE 
efficacy.  
H2: Rating dissonance will be positively related to the number of hours to 
complete the SPE. 
H3: The lower the accuracy, the greater the number of hours to complete the 
SPE. 
In federal government contracting, suppliers are provided the SPE ratings and given 
an opportunity to respond, rebut, agree and otherwise comment. Resolution takes effort 
expended to explain original positions internally and to seek the facts substantiating the 
ratings. Thus, supplier disputes, while allowed, are not necessarily welcomed. This 
phenomenon is not unique to government contracting; suppliers to for-profit businesses may 
have executive-level relationships within the buying organization and may use those 
communication channels to voice disagreement with SPEs. Herein, this phenomenon is 
defined as fear of a supplier dispute. Attempts among multiple raters to thwart a supplier 
rebuttal may invite internal conflict. Some evaluators may be inclined to inflate ratings to 
avoid a dispute, while others may take a legalistic, strict approach. If inflated, accuracy 
suffers. Given the above logic, it is hypothesized that 
H4: The lower the perceived accuracy, the greater the fear of supplier 
dispute. 
H5: There will be a positive relationship between fear of supplier dispute and 
rating dissonance.  
Performance ratings are also constrained by information flow between a rater and 
ratee. Informational constraints implies that some self/supervisor discrepancies result from 
differing cognitions about job requirements. When performing any job, an employee must 
consider what tasks are to be done, how these tasks are to be performed, and what 
standards are to be used in judging the final outcome. Ideally, these determinations are 
arrived at in close consultation with the individual’s supervisor, thus ensuring identical 
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cognitions about job requirements. In reality, such complete agreement is rarely achieved. 
The extensive literature on role ambiguity (e.g., House & Rizzo, 1972; Jackson & Schuler, 
1985; Rizzo et al., 1970) provides strong evidence that employees often do not have a clear 
idea of what their supervisors expect (Campbell & Lee, 1988, p. 304).  
These findings are particularly relevant in service contracts in which requirements 
are often not well defined (van der Valk & Rozemeijer, 2009). Different expectations among 
different performance evaluators of contractor requirements can affect performance 
evaluations.  
Informational constraints can also stem from a supervisor’s misunderstanding of the 
employee’s job (Mitchell, 1983). Managers who are recruited from outside the company may 
have incomplete or inaccurate beliefs about a subordinate’s job. Similarly, in situations in 
which jobs are highly interconnected and interdependent, a supervisor either may be unable 
to clearly separate the boundaries and duties of different jobs or may do so incorrectly 
(Kiggundu, 1981). A supervisor’s misunderstanding of a subordinate’s job also may reflect 
lack of observation (e.g., Mitchell, 1983). This has implications for a proper amount and 
method of monitoring suppliers. Insufficient observation can be attributed to the number of 
other responsibilities a manager has to the inherent nature of one’s job. “Thus, it is not 
surprising that employees and supervisors may come to different conclusions about the 
employee’s effectiveness. If initial cognitions about job responsibilities and standards differ, 
lack of agreement in ratings is inevitable” (Campbell & Lee, 1988, p. 305). Given that in 
contracting for services, requirements are often ill defined and given the high level of 
turnover in buyer-side contract administration (Hawkins et al., 2015), dissonance in supplier 
performance ratings should be commonplace. Buffa and Ross (2011) identified evaluator 
turnover as having a potential impact on supplier evaluations over time. Therefore, is it 
posited that 
H6: There will be a negative relationship between the sufficiency of the 
requirement definition and rating dissonance.  
H7: There will be a positive relationship between the sufficiency of the 
requirement definition and perceived accuracy of the SPE. 
H8: There will be a negative relationship between evaluator turnover and 
perceived accuracy of the SPE. 
Sometimes the employee or the supervisor knowingly gives an inaccurate appraisal. 
A supervisor may do so to preserve the effectiveness of an interdependent work group 
(Campbell & Lee, 1988). Academic literature confirms a halo effect in employee 
performance appraisals (Thomas & Bretz, 1994). The same concern has specifically been 
raised regarding SPEs (Kelman, 2010). A halo effect could partially explain inflated (i.e., 
inaccurate) SPEs. Deliberate dishonesty is more likely to occur in self appraisals when they 
are used for scarce resource allocation decisions (Shrauger & Osberg, 1981). In a supplier 
relationship context, supplier evaluations may also be tainted by a supplier seeking to 
preserve its reputation. Suppliers may refute any negative information being recorded 
regardless of its accuracy. To do so, they often challenge the rating and/or justification, 
which causes more effort by the buying organization to resolve disagreements. If buying 
organizations either can’t muster the evidence to justify a particular rating and/or 
consciously decide not to bother with the trouble to debate the rating, accuracy can suffer. 
Thus, it is hypothesized that 
H9: There will be a negative relationship between perceived accuracy and 
rating dissonance. 
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H10: There will be a positive relationship between perceived accuracy and 
SPE efficacy. 
Channel Communication 
In channel communication theory, Mohr and Sohi (1995) introduced “distortion.” 
Formality decreases communication distortion. Examining the government’s past 
performance reporting system (CPARS), the reporting is quite rigid and formal. However, the 
collaboration between multiple raters occurs outside of the CPAR system (i.e., not formal 
and highly variable). In examining channel communication, often three aspects of 
communication are explored—formality, bi-directionality, and frequency. If these three facets 
of communication among exchange members increases, more information is shared, better 
understandings are attained, and therefore, the accuracy of SPEs should increase. 
Therefore, it is posited that 
H11: There will be a positive relationship between communication frequency 
and perceived accuracy. 
H12: There will be a positive relationship between communication bi-
directionality and perceived accuracy. 
H13: There will be a positive relationship between communication formality 
and perceived accuracy. 
Weaknesses in evaluators’ communications could be linked to resource constraints. 
Government acquisition personnel are often overworked and understaffed. Combined, this 
phenomenon is referred to as role overload. Evaluators may simply not have sufficient time 
to gather the requisite facts and write thorough, sufficient justifications for SPE assessments 
and ratings. Likewise, evaluators may not have time to reconcile rating dissonance among 
multiple evaluators. Therefore, it is posited that 
H14: There is a negative relationship between role overload and rating 
justification. 
H15: There is a positive relationship between role overload and rating 
dissonance. 
Critics contend that SPEs are often not accurate, and therefore the SPE system 
(e.g., CPARS) is not useful. If not factual and detailed, the SPEs cannot motivate suppliers 
to work harder and cannot provide insights that reduce the risk of adverse selection in the 
future. Hence, absent accuracy, SPEs become less useful. Further, if the SPE scheme is 
not useful, evaluators will not put forth the effort required to develop a detailed, factual rating 
justification that will be accepted by the supplier and, if rebutted, internally by the reviewing 
official., Thus, it is posited that 
H16: There is a positive relationship between perceived usefulness and rating 
justification. 
H17: There is a positive relationship between perceived accuracy and rating 
justification.  
H18: There will be a positive relationship between rating justification and SPE 
efficacy. 
H19: There will be a positive relationship between perceived accuracy and 
perceived usefulness. 
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Social Exchange Theory 
Social exchange theory (SET) is commonly used as a foundation for relationship 
marketing and buyer–seller relationships (e.g., Dwyer et al., 1987; Kingshott, 2006; Luo, 
2002; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wilson, 1995). The foundational premises of SET may be 
summarized as follows. Exchange may involve both social and economic outcomes. These 
outcomes are compared to other exchange alternatives. Positive outcomes increase trust 
and commitment and, over time, norms develop that govern the relationship (Lambe, 
Wittmann, & Spekman 2001). Thus, SET rejects the assumption of universal opportunism 
and suggests that there is an alternate form of governance—the relationship. Parties to 
relational exchange, therefore, tend to rely more on trust, commitment, cooperation, 
satisfaction, and relational norms than strictly on written contracts (Heide & John, 1992). 
Contracts are incomplete, and can be costly and inefficient to administer as their details 
increase. Relational exchange renders the exchange more efficient.  
Relational aspects have also been found to play a mediating role between suppliers’ 
operational performance measures and a buyer’s business performance. Hence, measuring 
performance alone does not affect business performance. Rather, measuring supplier 
performance increases socialization mechanisms, which, in turn, increase business 
performance (Cousins, Lawson, & Squire, 2008). Socialization mechanisms are structures 
and processes that facilitate contact between the buyers and suppliers such as cross-
functional teams, joint sessions, routine supplier conferences, and matrix reporting 
structures. These interactions enable each party to acquire knowledge of the others’ social 
values and behavioral norms. Interactions entail communications. Communication increases 
trust (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), a central construct to effective relational exchange.  
Research that developed a taxonomy of buyer–supplier relationship types (Cannon & 
Perreault, 1999) associated higher supplier performance evaluations to more collaborative 
types of relationships. Such relationships are characterized by greater operational linkages, 
information exchanges, cooperative norms, and buyer and supplier adaptations to each 
other (i.e., unique investment and customizations to processes and products for the other 
party’s benefit). With greater channel cooperation, both intra-firm and extra-firm, it is posited 
that  
H20: There will be a negative relationship between relationship quality and 
fear of a supplier dispute. 
H21: Communication frequency will be positively related to relationship 
quality. 
H22: Communication bi-directionality will be positively related to relationship 
quality. 
H23: There will be a positive relationship between communication formality 
and relationship quality. 
H24: Turnover will be negatively related to relationship quality. 
Returning to agency theory, much is said in the management, marketing, and supply 
chain literatures about supplier monitoring. Since increasing information via monitoring 
reduces uncertainty and helps prevent agent opportunism, monitoring plays an important 
role in exchange relationships. As it pertains to SPEs, surveillance is used to collect facts of 
supplier performance such as quality levels delivered, on-time performance, and generally 
meeting contractual requirements. These facts may be used to determine performance 
ratings. Therefore, it is posited that 
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H25: There will be a positive relationship between surveillance and perceived 
accuracy. 
One relational norm important to effective exchange is fairness (Kumar et al., 1995). 
Often the concept is referred to as distributive justice, referring to the extent to which each 
exchange member’s cost-benefit ratios are approximately equal. Government buyers in 
particular have a duty to treat suppliers fairly. In the for-profit sector, fair treatment of 
suppliers is paramount to effective relationship quality (Kumar et al., 1995). In a SPE 
context, fairness pertains to the extent to which the supplier is given the performance ratings 
it deserves. Fair ratings are those that have been earned, no more and no less. Particularly 
in cases in which requirements are not well defined, the criteria for evaluating supplier 
performance are not well defined, and/or the ratings used to assess performance are not 
well defined (or invite wide latitude in interpretation), a supplier must rely on the buyer to be 
fair. A deviation from a fair rating would insinuate a rating that is not right—or less than 
accurate.  
H26: There will be a positive relationship between fairness and perceived 
accuracy.  
Power/Dependence 
Power is among the most significant phenomena in buyer–supplier relationships. It is 
defined as the ability to cause someone to do something that he or she would not have done 
otherwise (Gaski, 1984). Power and dependence are two sides of the same coin (John, 
1984). In government contracting, extremely high switching costs create dependence of 
buyers on suppliers after the award of a contract. Additionally, sole source contracts are 
commonplace which gives rise to buyer dependence (and supplier power). In such cases, 
particularly when the buyer is less than diligent in its contract administration duties and 
oversight, buyers may be tempted to use SPEs as leverage to reap concessions from 
suppliers. In cases where ratings are subtly bargained for some concession, the accuracy of 
SPEs could be questioned. Therefore, it is posited that 
H27: Leverage attitude will be negatively related to perceived accuracy.  
Methodology 
This research will employ quantitative and qualitative methodologies to examine the 
antecedents and consequences of supplier performance evaluation efficacy (Table 1). First, 
the quantitative methodology and results are detailed, then the qualitative procedures and 
results are described.  
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 Research Questions  
 
The quantitative method will examine data collected via survey of the personnel with 
the requisite knowledge of contractor performance, CPARS assessing officials. The 
hypotheses will be tested using partial least squares (PLS) structural equation modeling 
(SEM). PLS SEM, versus covariance-based SEM, is the valid modeling approach when the 
model includes formative scales (Hair et al., 2014). PLS SEM also accommodates complex 
models with a large number of variables, can model non-normally distributed data, and does 
not pose problems with convergence often found in covariance-based SEM. 
The qualitative method entails collecting data via interviews with suppliers whose 
performance has been rated. According to Yin (2009), a qualitative methodology is 
appropriate when three conditions exist: (1) The type of research question is exploratory in 
nature and takes the form of a “why” question, (2) the researcher has no control of the 
behavioral events being researched (i.e., cannot manipulate behaviors then measure results 
as in a controlled experiment), and (3) the focus is on contemporary events (p. 8). The 
research questions surrounding supplier reactions to performance evaluations met all three 
criteria.  
Discussion 
Substantial transaction costs are dedicated to avoid adverse selection—the risk of 
selecting an incapable supplier that otherwise misrepresents itself as capable. Following 
contract formation, more transaction costs are incurred to monitor supplier performance to 
thwart supplier opportunism ex post. The effectiveness of a mechanism to monitor and 
record supplier performance information, a supplier performance evaluation, was the topic of 
this study. 
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There are many concerns that the SPEs/ratings are not properly, timely, or 
accurately completed. Unreliable or inaccurate past performance assessments can harm 
suppliers’ reputations and can bias source selections, resulting in adverse selection. If past 
performance information is not reliable, and if evaluators don’t use it in discriminating 
between competitive proposals, the effort of collecting and reporting the past performance 
information is squandered. Likewise, the effort of evaluating and documenting inaccurate 
past performance information during source selections would be wasted. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that buying organizations often do not use past performance information 
as a meaningful discriminator between proposals. 
The purpose of the research, therefore, was to explore the antecedents to and 
consequences of the efficacy of SPEs.  
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